Interactive research
Follow the prompt.
Find the boundary.
Explore five domains of the attack surface, from discovery and delivery to impact and defensive controls.

Source edition / September 2026
The prompt injection attack surface.
Explore the original map. Select a node for its definition, MITRE ATLAS mapping, documented examples, and source links.
Browse the accessible text version
Reconnaissance & Discovery
How attackers find and profile AI agents before injecting anything. MITRE ATLAS formalized this phase in 2026 with a set of agent-specific reconnaissance techniques — the pre-attack surface most defenders don't yet monitor.
Agent Discovery
Locating deployed agents that are reachable at all.
Enumerate agents behind predictable URLs
Agents hosted on platforms with URL structures derived from environment, tenant, or resource IDs can be enumerated by guessing the pattern — no credentials needed to find them.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0006.000, contributed from Zenity Labs research (2026).
Source mapping: AML.T0006.000 · Enumerate Hosted AI Resources · Reconnaissance
Search open web for embedded agents
Search results and backlink analysis surface embedded agentic interfaces and let an attacker reverse-engineer internal identifiers from public pages.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0006 (expanded), 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0006 · Active Scanning · Reconnaissance
Scan internet databases (Shodan/Censys)
Third-party internet-wide scan services are queried to discover exposed AI services and agent endpoints at scale.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0000.003, 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0000.003 · Scan Databases · Reconnaissance
Infrastructure Profiling
Mapping the platform an agent runs on.
Query provider metadata APIs
Provider metadata endpoints are interrogated to enumerate available AI agents and infrastructure details.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0006.001, 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0006.001 · Query Platform Metadata APIs · Reconnaissance
Scan for exposed AI infrastructure
Attackers probe for misconfigured or publicly reachable AI systems and their supporting infrastructure.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0006.002, 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0006.002 · Scan for Exposed AI Infrastructure · Reconnaissance
Misconfigured / publicly exposed services
Missing authentication and permissive defaults hand unauthenticated attackers a working entry point into an agent.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0132, 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0132 · Misconfigured or Publicly Exposed AI Services · Initial Access
Capability Enumeration
Learning what a reachable agent can actually do.
Probe public trigger channels
Webhooks, agent email addresses, and other public trigger channels are poked to see what responds and how — mapping the ways an agent can be invoked.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0006.003, 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0006.003 · Probe AI Agent Trigger Channels · Reconnaissance
Discover agent runtime capabilities
Direct interaction with an agent enumerates its available tools and permission scopes, so the attacker knows exactly what an injection could reach.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0133, 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0133 · Discover AI Agent Runtime Capabilities · Discovery
Injection Vectors
How attacker instructions reach the model. The fastest-moving domain — most 2026 additions are new places instructions can live, not new ways to phrase them.
Direct Input
The attacker interacts with the model directly as a user.
Attacker-as-user prompting
Malicious instructions typed straight into the chat or API — the classic jailbreak surface. Low sophistication, but still the front door for testing what a deployed model will do.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.000 · LLM Prompt Injection: Direct · Execution
Malicious file attachments
Uploaded documents carry instructions in white-on-white text, metadata fields, or embedded objects that the model reads even though a human reviewer would not.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
User-Mediated Delivery
A legitimate user unknowingly carries the payload in.
Copy-paste smuggling
Content copied from a website or document brings invisible Unicode or hidden text along with it; the user pastes instructions they cannot see into their own prompt.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
Poisoned prompt templates
Shared prompt libraries and “mega-prompt” templates ship with embedded directives that execute for every user who adopts them.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
Compromised browser extensions
An extension with page access injects instructions into the context an AI browser or side-panel assistant reads.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
Crafted AI assistant links
A shared link opens the victim’s assistant pre-loaded with attacker instructions passed as URL parameters — and can poison cross-session memory so the payload outlives the click.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0131, contributed from Zenity Labs research (2026).
Source mapping: AML.T0131 · Crafted AI Assistant Links · Initial Access
Retrieved Content
The model fetches the payload itself — email, web, knowledge bases, telemetry.
Web page injection
Hidden instructions in HTML attributes, CSS-suppressed elements, or off-screen text on pages an agent browses or summarizes. Now operational, not theoretical.
From the source edition: Unit 42 documented 22 distinct techniques on live malicious sites, with visible-plaintext concealment the single most common delivery method.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
AI-targeted cloaking
Sites serve different content to AI crawlers and agents than to human visitors, so the injection is invisible to anyone who checks the page manually. Now formalized as MITRE ATLAS AML.T0134.
From the source edition: First observed case: AI ad-review evasion — hidden instructions that let malicious ads pass automated moderation (Dec 2025, published Mar 2026).
Source mapping: AML.T0134 · AI Targeted Cloaking · Defense Evasion
Email & calendar payloads
Instructions in a message body, invite description, or subject line execute when an assistant summarizes the inbox or calendar. The premier zero-click vector.
From the source edition: EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711) exfiltrated M365 data via one crafted email; Zenity’s 2026 “PleaseFix” chain hijacked five AI browsers the same way.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
RAG & knowledge-base poisoning
Malicious records planted in vector stores, wikis, or indexed documents surface as trusted context whenever retrieval touches them — one poisoned entry can steer many users’ sessions.
Source mapping: AML.T0070 · RAG Poisoning · Persistence
Log & telemetry injection
Attacker-controlled strings in logs, alerts, and dashboards become instructions when an AI assistant analyzes them — turning SOC and observability tooling into an injection surface.
From the source edition: “GrafanaGhost” (Apr 2026): poisoned Grafana log entries drove an AI assistant to exfiltrate data through Markdown rendering.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
Browser history poisoning
Planting fake entries in browsing history that agentic browsers later treat as trusted facts about the user and their intent.
From the source edition: Zenity’s “HistoryFixing” technique, demonstrated at Black Hat USA 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0080 · AI Agent Context Poisoning · Persistence
Tooling & Supply Chain
The agent’s own tooling metadata carries the payload.
Tool-description poisoning
Instructions hidden in an MCP server’s tool descriptions execute when the agent loads the tool — no user-visible content involved. Now an OWASP-catalogued attack.
Source mapping: AML.T0110.000 · AI Agent Tool Poisoning: Definition and Instructions · Persistence
Rug-pull tool updates
A tool behaves cleanly at review time, then a later update swaps in malicious descriptions or behavior after trust is established.
Source mapping: AML.T0109 · AI Supply Chain Rug Pull ·
Weaponized skill & rules files
Per-project config files — rules files, skills, agent instructions — as a malware-style delivery channel, complete with supply-chain distribution.
From the source edition: Zenity’s “Promptware” research at Black Hat 2026 treated skill files, MCP servers, and misaligned models as an end-to-end malicious supply chain.
Source mapping: AML.T0081 · Modify AI Agent Configuration · Persistence
Poisoned repo metadata & CI
Commit messages, issues, branch names, and PR text execute when coding agents and CI-integrated assistants process them.
From the source edition: Three CVEs in Anthropic’s MCP Git server (Jan 2026) via commit messages and branch names; booby-trapped GitHub issues steering CI agents.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
Synthetic tool outputs
Forged tool results injected into the agent loop — the model trusts a “tool response” that no tool produced.
Source mapping: AML.T0110.002 · AI Agent Tool Poisoning: Runtime Response · Persistence
Agent Ecosystem
Payloads that move between agents, sessions, and memories.
Agent-to-agent injection
In multi-agent systems, one compromised agent’s output becomes another’s instructions — injections propagate across the mesh.
Source mapping: AML.T0118 · Autonomous AI Agent Communication · AI Attack Adaptation
Persistent memory poisoning
Instructions written into long-term memory features re-execute in every future session, long after the original poisoned content is gone.
Source mapping: AML.T0080.000 · AI Agent Context Poisoning: Memory · Persistence
Cross-session prompt residue
Leftover context — cached reasoning, session artifacts — reused across sessions and users becomes an unintended carrier for stale attacker instructions.
From the source edition: Demonstrated against GitHub, Slack, and Jira agent integrations at Black Hat 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0080.001 · AI Agent Context Poisoning: Thread · Persistence
Prior-model-output injection
Output from one model, stored and later fed to another, carries instructions across trust boundaries neither system checks.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.001 · LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect · Execution
Multimodal Carriers
Non-text channels that smuggle instructions past text-based defenses.
Image-embedded instructions
Near-invisible text overlaid on images defeats content labeling and scanner-based defenses; the vision model reads what the human eye misses.
From the source edition: Brave’s Black Hat 2026 research bypassed layered defenses — strong prompts, content labeling, tool scanning, verifier models — with image overlays.
Source mapping: AML.T0129 · Triggers in Multimodal Inputs · Defense Evasion
Audio & transcription poisoning
Adversarial audio yields transcripts containing instructions the speaker never audibly said.
Source mapping: AML.T0129 · Triggers in Multimodal Inputs · Defense Evasion
UI & markup camouflage
Instructions tucked into spoiler tags, alt text, and ARIA attributes — read by agents, hidden from people.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
File & media metadata triggers
Instructions hidden in the metadata of image, audio, video, or document files — parsed by the model even though no reviewer opens the metadata.
From the source edition: MITRE ATLAS AML.T0129 (Triggers in Multimodal Inputs), 2026.
Source mapping: AML.T0129 · Triggers in Multimodal Inputs · Defense Evasion
Manipulation Techniques
How a delivered payload subverts model behavior — the domain jailbreak research has mapped deepest.
Instruction Override
Directly rewriting what the model believes its rules are.
Rule addition & nullification
“New rule:” / “ignore previous instructions” — appending, negating, or substituting operating rules.
Source mapping: AML.T0051 · LLM Prompt Injection · Execution
Authority & system spoofing
Payloads impersonate system messages, administrators, or claim pre-authorization the user never gave.
Source mapping: AML.T0051 · LLM Prompt Injection · Execution
Refusal suppression
Forbidding refusal language itself — apologies, warnings, “I can’t” — so declining stops being an available output.
Source mapping: AML.T0054 · LLM Jailbreak · Defense Evasion
Dormant trigger rules
Sleeper instructions planted early that stay inert until a trigger phrase activates them turns later — evading point-in-time inspection.
From the source edition: Named “Trigger-Activated Rule Addition” in CrowdStrike’s July 2026 taxonomy update.
Source mapping: AML.T0051.002 · LLM Prompt Injection: Triggered · Execution
Obfuscation & Encoding
Making the payload unreadable to filters but readable to the model.
Invisible Unicode smuggling
Zero-width and Unicode tag characters carry instructions no human reviewer can see in rendered text.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
Encoded payloads
Base64, ciphers, and attacker-invented encodings the model helpfully decodes — sometimes assembled at runtime from fragments.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
Payload splitting & reassembly
Instructions fragmented into pieces that look benign individually and only become malicious when the model recombines them.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
Multilingual & low-resource evasion
Payloads in languages or dialects where safety training is thinnest, or switched mid-prompt to shake classifiers.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
Homoglyph & typographic substitution
Look-alike characters, deliberate typos, and formatting tricks that break keyword matching while preserving meaning.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
Boundary Exploitation
Attacking the seams between system, user, and data.
Special-token & delimiter mimicry
Payloads imitate chat-template tokens and formatting boundaries so untrusted content gets parsed as privileged instructions.
From the source edition: Named “Special Token Injection” in CrowdStrike’s July 2026 update.
Source mapping: AML.T0051 · LLM Prompt Injection · Execution
Forged conversation history
Fake prior turns — including fabricated assistant agreements — imported as few-shot context the model then continues.
Source mapping: AML.T0051 · LLM Prompt Injection · Execution
Format-boundary confusion
Code fences, quotes, and markup used to make instructions look like inert data, or data look like instructions.
Source mapping: AML.T0068 · LLM Prompt Obfuscation · Defense Evasion
Reasoning-Layer Attacks
Targeting how the model thinks rather than what it is told.
Reasoning-channel injection
Injecting into hidden reasoning and execution channels rather than the visible prompt — hijacking chain-of-thought and internal tool calls directly.
From the source edition: Palo Alto’s Black Hat 2026 “Reasoning Injection Attack” hijacked hidden python execution channels in a full sandbox-compromise chain.
Source mapping: AML.T0051 · LLM Prompt Injection · Execution
Reasoning hijack & overload
Steering deliberation with contrived logic, or exhausting it with complexity so safety checks get crowded out.
Source mapping: AML.T0051 · LLM Prompt Injection · Execution
Safety-token suppression
Blocking safety-related tokens and reasoning tags so the model cannot produce its own guardrail language.
From the source edition: Named “Cognitive Token Suppression” in CrowdStrike’s July 2026 update.
Source mapping: AML.T0054 · LLM Jailbreak · Defense Evasion
Multi-Turn & Persistence
Attacks that unfold across turns and sessions.
Gradual steering
Crescendo-style escalation: each turn moves one plausible step until the destination is somewhere the model would have refused outright.
Source mapping: AML.T0054 · LLM Jailbreak · Defense Evasion
In-session protocol setup
Establishing codewords, variables, or private rules early that later turns invoke innocuously.
Source mapping: AML.T0094 · Delay Execution of LLM Instructions · Defense Evasion
Memory implantation
Asking the assistant to “remember” attacker rules so its own memory feature becomes the persistence mechanism.
Source mapping: AML.T0080.000 · AI Agent Context Poisoning: Memory · Persistence
Social & Cognitive Framing
Persuasion aimed at the model’s judgment.
Roleplay & fictional framing
Harmful requests wrapped in personas, stories, or games so compliance reads as staying in character.
Source mapping: AML.T0054 · LLM Jailbreak · Defense Evasion
Urgency & authority pressure
Manufactured emergencies, claimed credentials, and false stakes that make refusal feel like the harmful act.
Source mapping: AML.T0054 · LLM Jailbreak · Defense Evasion
Detached-reality framing
“Test mode”, “sandboxed environment”, “outputs don’t matter here” — convincing the model consequences don’t apply.
Source mapping: AML.T0054 · LLM Jailbreak · Defense Evasion
Attack Outcomes
What injections achieve once they land — the impact dimension most taxonomies stop short of.
Data Exfiltration
Getting secrets out through the model’s own channels.
Zero-click exfiltration
Data theft with no user interaction: the assistant processes attacker content in the background and leaks on its own.
From the source edition: EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711) against Microsoft 365 Copilot — one email, no clicks.
Source mapping: AML.T0057 · LLM Data Leakage · Exfiltration
Rendering-channel leaks
Markdown images and crafted links smuggle data into URLs that fire automatically when the response renders.
Source mapping: AML.T0077 · LLM Response Rendering · Exfiltration
Credential & vault theft
Agents with browser or filesystem reach are steered into harvesting stored credentials.
From the source edition: Zenity’s Comet chain exploited the 1Password extension to steal an entire password vault from a spoofed calendar invite.
Source mapping: AML.T0086 · Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation · Exfiltration
Action Hijacking
The agent’s legitimate capabilities, misdirected.
Fraudulent transactions
Injected instructions drive purchases, transfers, and subscription changes with the victim’s standing payment authority.
From the source edition: CSA documented forced $5,000 PayPal transfer attempts and Stripe subscription fraud among in-the-wild injection intents.
Source mapping: AML.T0053 · AI Agent Tool Invocation · Execution
Outbound phishing & messaging
The victim’s own assistant sends phishing and scam messages from their accounts, inheriting their trust.
From the source edition: ChatGPT Atlas hijack sent WhatsApp phishing from the victim’s identity (Black Hat 2026).
Source mapping: AML.T0053 · AI Agent Tool Invocation · Execution
Destructive operations
Recursive file deletion, dropped databases, deleted cloud infrastructure — sabotage through granted permissions.
From the source edition: Zenity’s demos included Gemini deleting AWS servers and Copilot Edge corrupting SQL databases via localhost access.
Source mapping: AML.T0101 · Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation · Impact
Privilege Escalation Chains
Injection as the first stage of classic exploitation.
Prompt-to-RCE
Injections chain into deserialization, path traversal, and command execution bugs in agent frameworks — a prompt becomes an initial-access vector.
From the source edition: Microsoft’s May 2026 research and Check Point’s 11 framework vulnerabilities across LangChain, CrewAI, and AutoGen.
Source mapping: AML.T0050 · Command and Scripting Interpreter · Execution
Sandbox escape
Breaking out of the model’s execution sandbox into the hosting platform, including cross-tenant reach.
From the source edition: Demonstrated at Black Hat 2026 against ChatGPT’s sandbox and Cloudflare Workers code execution.
Source mapping: AML.T0105 · Escape to Host · Privilege Escalation
Internal network reach
Agents with localhost or intranet access become an SSRF proxy into environments the attacker could never touch directly.
Source mapping: AML.T0053 · AI Agent Tool Invocation · Lateral Movement
Persistence & Lateral Movement
Staying in, and spreading.
Memory persistence
Implanted instructions survive session resets and re-execute indefinitely from the assistant’s own memory.
Source mapping: AML.T0080.000 · AI Agent Context Poisoning: Memory · Persistence
Cross-agent propagation
A payload hops between agents in a workflow, compromising systems the initial injection never touched.
Source mapping: AML.T0061 · LLM Prompt Self-Replication · Persistence
Account takeover chains
One injection pivots across connected services — email, chat, code hosting — into full account compromise.
From the source edition: Zenity’s single-email chain reached Gmail, Drive, Slack, and X account takeover.
Source mapping: AML.T0053 · AI Agent Tool Invocation · Lateral Movement
Kinetic Impact
Injections against agents that control physical systems — data manipulation becomes physical-world compromise. Newly named as an attack class at Black Hat 2026.
Source mapping: · No direct ATLAS technique · Impact
Integrity & Influence
Corrupting decisions rather than stealing data.
Moderation & review evasion
Injected instructions make AI reviewers approve content they should reject — the first injection class observed operating at scale in the wild.
From the source edition: AI ad-review evasion observed by Unit 42, December 2025.
Source mapping: AML.T0130 · AI Agent Response Biasing · Impact
Decision manipulation
Skewing AI-assisted screening, ranking, and recommendations — résumé filtering, vendor scoring, triage queues.
From the source edition: Recruitment-screening manipulation documented among in-the-wild injection intents.
Source mapping: AML.T0130 · AI Agent Response Biasing · Impact
Defensive Controls
No single control stops prompt injection. These layers assume injection will land and limit what it can do.
Architecture
Design decisions that cap the blast radius.
Least-privilege agents
Scope every agent to the minimum tools, data, and identities its task needs — the injection inherits only what the agent holds.
Human-in-the-loop gates
Consequential actions — payments, sends, deletes, publishes — require a person to confirm, outside the model’s control.
Context isolation & trust labeling
Keep untrusted content structurally separate from instructions and track its provenance through the pipeline, so “data” can’t silently become “commands”.
Input & Output Controls
Filtering on the way in, containment on the way out.
Injection scanning & classifiers
Detect known payload patterns in retrieved content. Necessary but insufficient — Black Hat 2026 research bypassed layered scanner defenses with image overlays alone.
Egress & rendering controls
Block auto-loading images, restrict outbound URLs, and constrain markdown rendering — closing the channels exfiltration actually uses.
Tool allowlisting & scoped credentials
Agents call only vetted tools with short-lived, narrowly scoped credentials; an injected instruction can’t invoke what isn’t there.
Supply Chain Hygiene
Treating agent tooling like the software supply chain it is.
MCP server & tool vetting
Review and pin tool versions, hash descriptions, and re-verify on every update — rug-pull attacks depend on unwatched changes.
Skill & rules file review
Config files that steer agents get code-review treatment, including scanning for invisible Unicode.
Detection & Response
Assume compromise; watch behavior.
Agent action telemetry
Log every tool call, retrieval, and output channel; alert on anomalies like unexpected egress or privilege use.
Continuous red teaming
Test deployed agents with current techniques — this taxonomy — on a schedule, not once at launch.
Governance
Making the risk owned, not assumed.
OWASP LLM Top 10 alignment
Map controls to LLM01 and its siblings so coverage is auditable and gaps are explicit.
AI-feature vendor evaluation
Procurement asks how a product isolates untrusted content, gates actions, and handled its last injection disclosure.
No matching techniques. Try a shorter term or reset the explorer.
Original Defensive visualization, mapped to MITRE ATLAS. References, examples, and mappings retain the September 2026 edition’s context; this is an educational aid, not a complete security assessment.
From research to controls
Test the boundaries that matter.
Efficacy first. Always.
What’s next
for your world?
Bring us the problem, the constraints, and the outcome you need. We’ll help shape a practical way forward.
